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这篇的标题是 - Blanket repression is the wrong way to deal with political Islamists
全面镇压并不是应对政治伊斯兰主义者的正确方法
Their record in power is often worrying. But they can be pragmatic and cannot be ignored
他们的权力历史经常让人担心，但他们可以是务实的，且无法被忽视
LESS than a decade ago Islamist parties were an irresistible force in the Middle East. As dictators quaked in the Arab uprisings of 2011, these groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, gained influence and seized control. The mosque and the ballot box seemed to have replaced the palace, the barracks and the secret police as a source of power.
不到十年前，伊斯兰政党在中东还是一股强大的势力。随着2011年阿拉伯起义时的独裁者们纷纷下台，这些组织，尤其是穆斯林兄弟会和他的分支组织，开始有了影响力并且拿到的控制权。清真寺和投票箱貌似取代了宫殿，兵营和秘密警察成了权力的来源
But in the wreckage of the Arab world today, many act as if the idea that Islamists can play a useful democratic role is broken, too. They are being repressed anew by reactionary regimes, challenged by violent jihadists and looked upon with suspicion by voters whom they failed. Many are in jail or exile. Their main bankroller, Qatar, is being subjected to diplomatic and economic ostracism by its Arab neighbours, with the backing of President Donald Trump. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are urging Western governments to brand the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists.
但在今天阿拉伯世界的废墟中，许多貌似伊斯兰主义者可以在民主化发挥作用的想法失败了。他们重新被反动政权所压制，受到暴力圣战者的挑衅，很多对他们不满的投票者也对他们表示怀疑。很多人被关进监狱或是流放。他们的主要资助者，卡塔尔，正在遭受他们阿拉伯邻居们外交和经济上的排斥，这背后有特朗普总统的推手。阿联酋，沙特和埃及正在敦促西方政府把穆斯林兄弟会看做恐怖分子
When jihadists kill—as they did again in Spain last week—it is indeed tempting to treat those who seek power in the name of Islam as a menace. Yet the blanket repression of all Islamists is the worst possible response. In the end, it will lead only to more resentment, more turmoil and more terrorism.
当圣战者行凶时，比如上周西班牙再次发生的恐怖袭击，人们确实很容易把这些以伊斯兰之名寻求权力之人看成是大的威胁。但是全面镇压所有伊斯兰主义者是最糟糕的反应。最终，它会导致更多的怨恨，更多的骚乱，和恐怖主义
Ninety-nine faces
Islamist groups come in many forms, from Ennahda, the Tunisians who call themselves “Muslim democrats”, to Hamas, the Palestinians who dispatched suicide-bombers to Israel. Those who would suppress them all make three errors: they claim Islamists are all the same; they say they are fundamentally undemocratic; and they think the solution lies with strongmen.
99张面孔
伊斯兰团体有很多种形式，从复兴党，突尼斯人把他们自己称作穆斯林民主党； 到哈马斯，那些用自杀炸弹细腻以色列的巴勒斯坦人。想要镇压他们的人都犯了三个错误： 他们宣称所有的伊斯兰主义者都一个样； 说他们从骨子里就不民主，并认为解决方案依赖于强权独裁者
Start with the conflation. Critics charge that political Islamists differ little from jihadists like al-Qaeda and Islamic State, since both sorts of groups seek to re-create an Islamic caliphate under sharia and disagree only over timing and means; worse, political Islam is often a gateway to violent jihad.
从合并开始。评论家控告政治伊斯兰主义者与基地组织或是伊斯兰国的圣战者没有多大区别，他们都在寻求重建以伊斯兰教法为核心的伊斯兰哈里发帝国，只是在时机和手段上有所分歧。更糟糕的是，政治伊斯兰通常是通往暴力圣战的大门
The Brotherhood is itself partly to blame for the blurring of distinctions. Its leaders have a habit of preaching non-violence in English while, as over Palestine and Syria, talking up resistance and even jihad in Arabic. Likewise, some of the violence against the Egyptian government appears to be the work of Brotherhood radicals. Prominent global jihadists include ex-Brothers, among them Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s leader.
这种区别的模糊，有部分原因要归咎于穆斯林兄弟会自身。他们的领导人习惯与用英语劝诫不要暴力，但在巴勒斯坦和叙利亚，却用阿拉伯语大谈特谈抵抗运动甚至圣战。同样的，针对埃及政府的一些暴力行动貌似也和兄弟会的激进分子有关。著名的全球圣战分子英包括前兄弟会成员，艾曼·扎瓦希里，基地组织领导人
But to lump all these groups together is simplistic. Violent jihadists draw on many sources to justify their gory deeds, not least the puritanical Salafism of Saudi Arabia, which competes with the Brothers. The jihadists loathe more moderate Islamists for focusing on piety, social services and elections. They think man-made laws are an affront to divine ones. To treat all Islamists as jihadists is a bit like saying social democrats are just like Italy’s Red Brigades because they all read Karl Marx.
但是把这些组织混为一谈也太过简化。暴力圣战分子通过各种渠道去为自己的血腥行为辩护，尤其是和兄弟会竞争的沙特萨拉菲清教徒。圣战分子厌恶温和伊斯兰主义者把重心放在虔诚，社会服务和选举之上的行为。他们觉得人类制定的法律是对神律的冒犯。把所有伊斯兰主义者当成圣战分子有点像把所有社会民主党当成意大利的红色旅一样，就因为他们都读卡尔马克思
What of democracy? The worry is that even non-violent Islamists treat elections as a tactic: one man, one vote, one time. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, was once a model Islamist, easy on religiosity and big on liberal reforms. These days, as he purges real and imagined foes, he is almost as awful as the Arab dictators he once denounced (he keeps winning elections, though). In Egypt the short-lived Islamist president, Muhammad Morsi, seemed to govern for the Brotherhood alone. He installed Brothers throughout the bureaucracy and declared himself to be above the (dubious) judiciary. He alienated other parties, provoking mass protests.
那么民主呢？让人担心的是，即便是非暴力的伊斯兰主义者，都把选举看成是一种策略。一人一次一票，土耳其总统艾尔多安曾经是个模范伊斯兰主义者，信仰虔诚而重视改革。最近，随着他对反对者和假想敌的打击与清理，他几乎跟他曾经谴责的那些阿拉伯独裁者一样烂（但是他总能赢的选举）。在埃及，在位时间不长的伊斯兰总统穆尔西，貌似只是为了兄弟会而执政。他把兄弟会成员安插在官僚系统的各个层级，并宣称自己凌驾于（可疑的）司法部之上。他疏远其他党派，引发了大规模抗议
Critics assume that Mr Erdogan and Mr Morsi are flawed because they are Islamist. But there is another explanation: that they have mimicked the power-grabbing tactics of Turkish and Egyptian strongmen to pre-empt efforts by the “security state” to seize back power—for Mr Morsi, unsuccessfully.
批评者认为多安和穆尔西的不端是因为他们是伊斯兰主义者。但是还有另外一个解释。他们模仿土耳其和埃及的铁腕人物的夺权策略，先发制人，打着“国家安全”的口号上位。只是对于莫西来讲，没能成功
A more hopeful example is Tunisia, where the Arab spring started. It has avoided both the chaos of civil war in Libya, and the chokehold of the secret policemen in Egypt and Algeria. Ennahda has had the good sense to share power with more secular groups, and even to yield to them. It knows that a fragile democratic transition requires broad consensus. In Morocco the king has ceded some power to the parliament and allowed an Islamist prime minister to lead a broad coalition.
一个更有希望些的例子是突尼斯，阿拉伯之春运动就是从那儿开始的。它既避免了利比亚内战的混乱，也躲过了埃及和阿尔及利亚秘密警察的黑手。伊斯兰复兴党愿意与更多的世俗团体分享权力，甚至向他们屈服。它知道，脆弱的民主过渡需要广泛的共识。在摩洛哥，国王已经将一些权力移交给议会，并允许一位伊斯兰教的总理领导一个广泛的联盟
The third error is to think that states can deal with the shortcomings of political Islam by relying on absolute monarchs and presidents-for-life. Their record is dire. From the Shah’s iron rule in Iran that led to revolution in 1979, through Saddam Hussein’s terror in Iraq, to the coup that reversed the electoral wins of Islamists in Algeria in 1992 and the crushing of protests by Bashar al-Assad in Syria in 2011, repression produces at best a brittle stability and at worst civil war. Unlike former autocrats in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, most of the Middle Eastern ones have failed to create durable prosperity.
第三个错误是认为国家可以依靠完全说了算的君主和终身总统来处理政治伊斯兰的问题。然而他们的记录是可悲的。伊朗国王的铁腕统治导致了1979年的大革命,萨达姆·侯赛因在伊拉克推行过恐怖的政变。1992年阿尔及利亚选举结果被政变推翻，2011年巴沙尔•阿萨德镇在叙利亚镇压抗议活动等等。 这种压抑导致了哪怕最好的结果也是局势不稳，而最坏则是内战。与韩国和台湾等国的前独裁者不同，中东地区的大多数国家都未能创造持久的繁荣。
Neither Sisi nor ISIS
Four years after the overthrow of Mr Morsi, it is hard to claim that he would have been worse than Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, the general who ousted him. Mr Sisi, now president, carried out the worst massacre in modern Egyptian history, killing hundreds of Mr Morsi’s supporters in Cairo in 2013. The country is more repressive than it was under Hosni Mubarak. Yet a jihadist insurgency rages in Sinai. And Mr Sisi has little idea of how to create jobs for Egypt’s surging population of youngsters.
既不要塞西也不要ISIS
在穆尔西被推翻四年之后，很难断言他会比阿卜杜勒-法塔赫塞西将军更糟糕。塞西将军是推翻穆尔西的人，也是现任总统。他在埃及上演了近代最为严重的大屠杀，2013年在开罗杀害了数百名穆尔西的支持者。这个国家比胡斯尼穆巴拉克治下的国家更加压抑。然而，在西奈半岛，圣战主义者的暴动却在肆虐。塞西也不知道如何为埃及数量激增的年轻人创造就业机会。
Oppression and misrule set the scene for the Arab world’s crisis; they will not soon be eradicated. However, autocracy is a dead end. Amid the bad choices, the only way out is the gradual opening of Arab economies and polities. That means letting ideologies compete, as long as they abjure violence and respect democratic norms. Competition must include Islamists, because Islam is so central to Middle Eastern society.
压迫和暴政为阿拉伯世界的危机树立了一个舞台;它们短期内无法被根除。然而，独裁统治是一个死胡同。在各种糟糕的选项里，唯一的出路是逐步开放阿拉伯经济和政治。这意味着让各种意识形态参与竞争，只要他们放弃暴力，尊重民主规范就成。竞争必须包括伊斯兰主义者，毕竟伊斯兰教是中东社会的核心。
Often illiberal on everything from the place of God in politics to the role of women, political Islamists are hardly the Christian Democrats of the Arab world. Yet they can be pragmatic and they cannot be ignored. Rather than trying to crush them all, which would only unite and radicalise them, the aim should be to work with moderates, demand that the obnoxious reform, and fight the most dangerous. In this way Islamists might serve as a roadblock to jihadism, not a path to it.
政治伊斯兰主义者几乎在各个方面都很偏执，从上帝在政治上的地位到女人的角色定位等等。所以他们很难在阿拉伯世界成为当年类似基督教的民主人士。然而，他们可以是务实的，绝不能被忽视。而不要试图粉碎他们，这只会使他们团结起来，使他们变得更加激进。目标应该是与温和派合作，要求那些进行令人厌恶的改革，并与最危险的人进行斗争。以这种方式，伊斯兰主义者有可能会成为圣战主义的障碍，而不是通往圣战的道路。
这篇的标题是 - Blanket repression is the wrong way to deal with political Islamists
全面镇压并不是应对政治伊斯兰主义者的正确方法
Their record in power is often worrying. But they can be pragmatic and cannot be ignored
他们的权力历史经常让人担心，但他们可以是务实的，且无法被忽视
LESS than a decade ago Islamist parties were an irresistible force in the Middle East. As dictators quaked in the Arab uprisings of 2011, these groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, gained influence and seized control. The mosque and the ballot box seemed to have replaced the palace, the barracks and the secret police as a source of power.
不到十年前，伊斯兰政党在中东还是一股强大的势力。随着2011年阿拉伯起义时的独裁者们纷纷下台，这些组织，尤其是穆斯林兄弟会和他的分支组织，开始有了影响力并且拿到的控制权。清真寺和投票箱貌似取代了宫殿，兵营和秘密警察成了权力的来源
But in the wreckage of the Arab world today, many act as if the idea that Islamists can play a useful democratic role is broken, too. They are being repressed anew by reactionary regimes, challenged by violent jihadists and looked upon with suspicion by voters whom they failed. Many are in jail or exile. Their main bankroller, Qatar, is being subjected to diplomatic and economic ostracism by its Arab neighbours, with the backing of President Donald Trump. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are urging Western governments to brand the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists.
但在今天阿拉伯世界的废墟中，许多貌似伊斯兰主义者可以在民主化发挥作用的想法失败了。他们重新被反动政权所压制，受到暴力圣战者的挑衅，很多对他们不满的投票者也对他们表示怀疑。很多人被关进监狱或是流放。他们的主要资助者，卡塔尔，正在遭受他们阿拉伯邻居们外交和经济上的排斥，这背后有特朗普总统的推手。阿联酋，沙特和埃及正在敦促西方政府把穆斯林兄弟会看做恐怖分子
When jihadists kill—as they did again in Spain last week—it is indeed tempting to treat those who seek power in the name of Islam as a menace. Yet the blanket repression of all Islamists is the worst possible response. In the end, it will lead only to more resentment, more turmoil and more terrorism.
当圣战者行凶时，比如上周西班牙再次发生的恐怖袭击，人们确实很容易把这些以伊斯兰之名寻求权力之人看成是大的威胁。但是全面镇压所有伊斯兰主义者是最糟糕的反应。最终，它会导致更多的怨恨，更多的骚乱，和恐怖主义
Ninety-nine faces
Islamist groups come in many forms, from Ennahda, the Tunisians who call themselves “Muslim democrats”, to Hamas, the Palestinians who dispatched suicide-bombers to Israel. Those who would suppress them all make three errors: they claim Islamists are all the same; they say they are fundamentally undemocratic; and they think the solution lies with strongmen.
99张面孔
伊斯兰团体有很多种形式，从复兴党，突尼斯人把他们自己称作穆斯林民主党； 到哈马斯，那些用自杀炸弹细腻以色列的巴勒斯坦人。想要镇压他们的人都犯了三个错误： 他们宣称所有的伊斯兰主义者都一个样； 说他们从骨子里就不民主，并认为解决方案依赖于强权独裁者
Start with the conflation. Critics charge that political Islamists differ little from jihadists like al-Qaeda and Islamic State, since both sorts of groups seek to re-create an Islamic caliphate under sharia and disagree only over timing and means; worse, political Islam is often a gateway to violent jihad.
从合并开始。评论家控告政治伊斯兰主义者与基地组织或是伊斯兰国的圣战者没有多大区别，他们都在寻求重建以伊斯兰教法为核心的伊斯兰哈里发帝国，只是在时机和手段上有所分歧。更糟糕的是，政治伊斯兰通常是通往暴力圣战的大门
The Brotherhood is itself partly to blame for the blurring of distinctions. Its leaders have a habit of preaching non-violence in English while, as over Palestine and Syria, talking up resistance and even jihad in Arabic. Likewise, some of the violence against the Egyptian government appears to be the work of Brotherhood radicals. Prominent global jihadists include ex-Brothers, among them Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s leader.
这种区别的模糊，有部分原因要归咎于穆斯林兄弟会自身。他们的领导人习惯与用英语劝诫不要暴力，但在巴勒斯坦和叙利亚，却用阿拉伯语大谈特谈抵抗运动甚至圣战。同样的，针对埃及政府的一些暴力行动貌似也和兄弟会的激进分子有关。著名的全球圣战分子英包括前兄弟会成员，艾曼·扎瓦希里，基地组织领导人
But to lump all these groups together is simplistic. Violent jihadists draw on many sources to justify their gory deeds, not least the puritanical Salafism of Saudi Arabia, which competes with the Brothers. The jihadists loathe more moderate Islamists for focusing on piety, social services and elections. They think man-made laws are an affront to divine ones. To treat all Islamists as jihadists is a bit like saying social democrats are just like Italy’s Red Brigades because they all read Karl Marx.
但是把这些组织混为一谈也太过简化。暴力圣战分子通过各种渠道去为自己的血腥行为辩护，尤其是和兄弟会竞争的沙特萨拉菲清教徒。圣战分子厌恶温和伊斯兰主义者把重心放在虔诚，社会服务和选举之上的行为。他们觉得人类制定的法律是对神律的冒犯。把所有伊斯兰主义者当成圣战分子有点像把所有社会民主党当成意大利的红色旅一样，就因为他们都读卡尔马克思
What of democracy? The worry is that even non-violent Islamists treat elections as a tactic: one man, one vote, one time. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, was once a model Islamist, easy on religiosity and big on liberal reforms. These days, as he purges real and imagined foes, he is almost as awful as the Arab dictators he once denounced (he keeps winning elections, though). In Egypt the short-lived Islamist president, Muhammad Morsi, seemed to govern for the Brotherhood alone. He installed Brothers throughout the bureaucracy and declared himself to be above the (dubious) judiciary. He alienated other parties, provoking mass protests.
那么民主呢？让人担心的是，即便是非暴力的伊斯兰主义者，都把选举看成是一种策略。一人一次一票，土耳其总统艾尔多安曾经是个模范伊斯兰主义者，信仰虔诚而重视改革。最近，随着他对反对者和假想敌的打击与清理，他几乎跟他曾经谴责的那些阿拉伯独裁者一样烂（但是他总能赢的选举）。在埃及，在位时间不长的伊斯兰总统穆尔西，貌似只是为了兄弟会而执政。他把兄弟会成员安插在官僚系统的各个层级，并宣称自己凌驾于（可疑的）司法部之上。他疏远其他党派，引发了大规模抗议
Critics assume that Mr Erdogan and Mr Morsi are flawed because they are Islamist. But there is another explanation: that they have mimicked the power-grabbing tactics of Turkish and Egyptian strongmen to pre-empt efforts by the “security state” to seize back power—for Mr Morsi, unsuccessfully.
批评者认为多安和穆尔西的不端是因为他们是伊斯兰主义者。但是还有另外一个解释。他们模仿土耳其和埃及的铁腕人物的夺权策略，先发制人，打着“国家安全”的口号上位。只是对于莫西来讲，没能成功
A more hopeful example is Tunisia, where the Arab spring started. It has avoided both the chaos of civil war in Libya, and the chokehold of the secret policemen in Egypt and Algeria. Ennahda has had the good sense to share power with more secular groups, and even to yield to them. It knows that a fragile democratic transition requires broad consensus. In Morocco the king has ceded some power to the parliament and allowed an Islamist prime minister to lead a broad coalition.
一个更有希望些的例子是突尼斯，阿拉伯之春运动就是从那儿开始的。它既避免了利比亚内战的混乱，也躲过了埃及和阿尔及利亚秘密警察的黑手。伊斯兰复兴党愿意与更多的世俗团体分享权力，甚至向他们屈服。它知道，脆弱的民主过渡需要广泛的共识。在摩洛哥，国王已经将一些权力移交给议会，并允许一位伊斯兰教的总理领导一个广泛的联盟
The third error is to think that states can deal with the shortcomings of political Islam by relying on absolute monarchs and presidents-for-life. Their record is dire. From the Shah’s iron rule in Iran that led to revolution in 1979, through Saddam Hussein’s terror in Iraq, to the coup that reversed the electoral wins of Islamists in Algeria in 1992 and the crushing of protests by Bashar al-Assad in Syria in 2011, repression produces at best a brittle stability and at worst civil war. Unlike former autocrats in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, most of the Middle Eastern ones have failed to create durable prosperity.
第三个错误是认为国家可以依靠完全说了算的君主和终身总统来处理政治伊斯兰的问题。然而他们的记录是可悲的。伊朗国王的铁腕统治导致了1979年的大革命,萨达姆·侯赛因在伊拉克推行过恐怖的政变。1992年阿尔及利亚选举结果被政变推翻，2011年巴沙尔•阿萨德镇在叙利亚镇压抗议活动等等。 这种压抑导致了哪怕最好的结果也是局势不稳，而最坏则是内战。与韩国和台湾等国的前独裁者不同，中东地区的大多数国家都未能创造持久的繁荣。
Neither Sisi nor ISIS
Four years after the overthrow of Mr Morsi, it is hard to claim that he would have been worse than Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, the general who ousted him. Mr Sisi, now president, carried out the worst massacre in modern Egyptian history, killing hundreds of Mr Morsi’s supporters in Cairo in 2013. The country is more repressive than it was under Hosni Mubarak. Yet a jihadist insurgency rages in Sinai. And Mr Sisi has little idea of how to create jobs for Egypt’s surging population of youngsters.
既不要塞西也不要ISIS
在穆尔西被推翻四年之后，很难断言他会比阿卜杜勒-法塔赫塞西将军更糟糕。塞西将军是推翻穆尔西的人，也是现任总统。他在埃及上演了近代最为严重的大屠杀，2013年在开罗杀害了数百名穆尔西的支持者。这个国家比胡斯尼穆巴拉克治下的国家更加压抑。然而，在西奈半岛，圣战主义者的暴动却在肆虐。塞西也不知道如何为埃及数量激增的年轻人创造就业机会。
Oppression and misrule set the scene for the Arab world’s crisis; they will not soon be eradicated. However, autocracy is a dead end. Amid the bad choices, the only way out is the gradual opening of Arab economies and polities. That means letting ideologies compete, as long as they abjure violence and respect democratic norms. Competition must include Islamists, because Islam is so central to Middle Eastern society.
压迫和暴政为阿拉伯世界的危机树立了一个舞台;它们短期内无法被根除。然而，独裁统治是一个死胡同。在各种糟糕的选项里，唯一的出路是逐步开放阿拉伯经济和政治。这意味着让各种意识形态参与竞争，只要他们放弃暴力，尊重民主规范就成。竞争必须包括伊斯兰主义者，毕竟伊斯兰教是中东社会的核心。
Often illiberal on everything from the place of God in politics to the role of women, political Islamists are hardly the Christian Democrats of the Arab world. Yet they can be pragmatic and they cannot be ignored. Rather than trying to crush them all, which would only unite and radicalise them, the aim should be to work with moderates, demand that the obnoxious reform, and fight the most dangerous. In this way Islamists might serve as a roadblock to jihadism, not a path to it.
政治伊斯兰主义者几乎在各个方面都很偏执，从上帝在政治上的地位到女人的角色定位等等。所以他们很难在阿拉伯世界成为当年类似基督教的民主人士。然而，他们可以是务实的，绝不能被忽视。而不要试图粉碎他们，这只会使他们团结起来，使他们变得更加激进。目标应该是与温和派合作，要求那些进行令人厌恶的改革，并与最危险的人进行斗争。以这种方式，伊斯兰主义者有可能会成为圣战主义的障碍，而不是通往圣战的道路。
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